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IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES TO PROCEEDING BELOW
In addition to the parties named in the caption, there
were two other defendants in the proceeding below.

Defendant

Gerald H. Burton was dismissed before trial pursuant to a
stipulation between the parties.

Defendant City of

Springville, a municipal corporation, prevailed on a motion for
a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence.

Neither

Mr. Burton nor the City of Springville i$ affected by this
appeal.
Since there are multiple parties to this appeal and
since separate appeals have been filed by these parties, the
defendant-appellant, The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad
Company, will be referred to herein as the "Rio Grande" or the
"railroad."

The plaintiff-respondent, Robert L. Gleave, will

be referred to as "Mr. Gleave."

The defendant-respondent, Utah

State Department of Transportation, will be referred to as
"UDOT" and the Utah State Public Service Commission as the
"UPSC."

The defendant-appellant, Utah Railway Company, is, for

all purposes relevant to this appeal, in the same position as
the Rio Grande and references herein to the Rio Grande shall be
deemed to also refer to the Utah Railway Company.
The Rio Grande and Mr. Gleave filed separate appeals.
The two separate appeals were consolidated by an order of this
Court and, since the consolidated case bears the same
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case number as the appeal filed by the Rio Grande, the appeal
of Mr. Gleave has now been designated as a cross-appeal.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT L. GLEAVE,

Plaintiff-Respondent
and Cross-Appellant,
vs
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation, UTAH RAILWAY
COMPANY, a corporation,

(Case No. 20166)
(Case No. 20300)
Consolidated Case No. 20300

Defendants-Appellants
and Cross-Respondents,
and
THE STATE OF UTAH,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant-Respondent
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS AND CROSS-RESPONDENTS THE DENVER AND
RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY AND UTAH RAILWAY COMPANY

ARGUMENT
I.

REPLY TO UDOT f S BRIEF
A.

THE STATE'S POSITION IS INCONSISTENT, AND IS
BASED UPON MISCHARACTERIZATION OF UTAH
LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS.

In Point I of its Brief, The St^te of Utah argues that
"railroad crossing safety is clearly a governmental function."
Brief of the State of Utah, Department of Transportation
(hereafter "UDOT Brief") at 5.

The State acknowledges that to

be a "governmental function," an activity must be "of such
unique nature that it can only be performed by a governmental
agency. . ."

UDOT Brief at 3 (emphasis added).

It argues that

activities such as the selection of traffic control devices for
a particular crossing and the allocation of funds for such
devices, are matters which "shall be performed by a
governmental agency" and which are "qualitatively different"
from what would be obtained by private [Railroad] oversight."
UDOT Brief at 4 & 5 (emphasis added.)
The State next contends that when it engages in this
activity, it utilizes a team of "transportation experts" who
"weigh the numerous factors" and decide if the "cost of more
adequate safety devices" at a particular crossing is outweighed
by the benefit to be obtained.

UDOT Brief at 9.

The State

notes that the "basic governmental program involved is the
uniform supervision and regulation of railroad crossings
throughout the State" (UDOT Brief at 7) and that the "safety of

a particular crossing must be evaluated in relation to the
safety of every other railroad crossing in the State."

UDOT

Brief at 8.
In summary, the State's position, as expressed in
Point I of its Brief, is that the determination and
implementation of traffic control measures at railroad
crossings is an activity that can only be done by the State
and that the State has accepted this responsibility and
employed teams of transportation experts who discharge this
essential governmental function with the utmost discretion.
Nevertheless, in Point II of its Brief, the State takes the
inconsistent and even absurd position that the function which
it just described is not really exclusively a governmental one.
The State does not attempt to explain with whom or how
this function is "shared."

Nor does it attempt to square this

new concept of non-exclusive authority with its previous
pronouncements that regulation in this field is something which
can only be done by government.

The State would appear to want

its authority to be non-exclusive only in those instances where
it would otherwise be the exclusive defendant.
To support its new claim that its authority to
regulate crossing protection is somehow and to some extent
nonexclusive, the State first cites what it asserts to be a
"conspicuous deletion" in 1975 of the word "exclusive" from the
text of Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15.
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This is a serious

mischaracterization of the 1975 amendment.

The 1975 amendment

of Section 54-4-15 coincided with the creation of UDOT and the
compiler notes that the only purpose for the amendment was to
substitute UDOT for the Public Service Commission ("PSC").
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15, Compiler's Notes (Supp. 1983).

6A
A new

subsection was added to the statute to give the PSC "exclusive"
supervisory authority over UDOT.

If the word "exclusive" had

not been dropped from the paragraphs discussing the power of
UDOT and moved to the new subsection discussing the powers of
the PSC, an argument could have been made that UDOT was not
subject to PSC review.

The 1975 amendment merely designated a

new State agency to have primary jurisdiction over the
regulation of railroad crossings.

There is nothing in the

amendment to suggest that it was enacted to eliminate the
exclusive nature of the State's authority and vest authority in
private entities (railroad's) to regulate vehicular traffic at
railroad crossings.

See Rio Grande's Opening Brief at 32-33.

The State also mischaracterizes Utah Code Ann. §
56-1-11.

This statute provides that "Evfery railroad shall be

liable for damages by its neglect to make and maintain good and
sufficient crossings at points where any line of travel
crosses its road."

Id. (emphasis added).

Section 56-1-11

does not impose any duty to remove visual obstructions near a
railroad-highway crossing, nor does it impose any duty to
install traffic safety devices.
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Rather, Section 56-1-11 only

imposes a duty to maintain the road surface between the rails
or immediately adjacent to the rails at a highway crossing.
In Denkers v. Southern Pacific Co., 52 Utah 18, 171
P. 999 (1918), the Utah Supreme Court explained that the
statutory phrase

,f

good and sufficient crossing" is understood

to refer to a crossing's "width, the grade of the approaches
thereto, the kind of material to be used in its construction on
either side of the railroad tracks, and the kind of ballast
that shall be used to fill in between the ties and rails,
etc."

52 Utah at 26-27, 171 P. at 1102,,

(emphasis added).

The Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed this interpretation in Van
Wagoner v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 112 Utah 189, 186 P.2d
293 (1947).

In that case, the Court approved a jury

instruction which described the statutory obligation of Section
56-1-11 as follows:

,f

[T]he railroad company is only obligated

to maintain the approaches to the crossing for a distance of
two feet on the outside of its rail and is not liable for
defects in the highway or approach to said crossing if said
defects are more than two feet from the outside of either
rail." 112 Utah at 218, 186 P.2d at 305 (emphasis added).
The State does not go so far as to suggest that
Section 56-1-11, or for that matter any other statute, actually
confers upon the Rio Grande the authority to implement traffic
control devices at railroad crossings.

If railroads did have

that power, most crossings would be closed and railroads would
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erect "dead end" or "do not enter" signs.

Allowing a highway

to cross over railroad tracks seldom, if ever, provides benefit
to the railroad.

It is only the exclusive nature of the

State's authority that prevents railroads from implementing
their own crossing regulation.

Yet, the State for some reason

"feels constrained" to contest this point.

The State's

position is all the more puzzling since the exclusive nature of
its authority to determine crossing protection is not even at
issue in this appeal.
The lower court instructed the jury that the
determination "regarding crossing design and crossing warning
and safety is placed under the control of UDOT" and the
railroad cannot be found "negligent based upon any defects
which might exist with respect to the design of the 1600 South
crossing or based upon any problems you may perceive in the
lack of traffic warning devices at the 1600 South crossing."
Jury Instruction No. 13, Exhibit "0" to Rio Grande's Opening
Brief.

No party has claimed that portion of the instructions

to have been erroneous.

Indeed, the State even asserts that a

decision regarding the exclusive nature of its authority is
"irrelevant" to the only issue which involves the State in this
appeal.

UDOT Brief at 12.

The State just "feels constrained"

to challenge any assertion that its authority is exclusive.
Id.
Despite the State's incomprehensible "feeling" that it
must challenge its own exclusive authority, the fact remains
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that its authority to determine appropriate crossing protection
is exclusive.

Motorists such as Mr. Gleave, railroads, and

other private citizens have no power to change traffic signs at
railroad crossings unless a governmental agency authorizes the
change.

It is nonsense for the State to claim otherwise,

especially after arguing that the regulation of highway traffic
at railroad crossings is something that can only be done by
governmental entities.
The State, nevertheless, appears to make some sense
when it claims UDOT would not prevent the Rio Grande from
slowing its trains or removing visual obstructions at this
particular crossing.

UDOT Brief at 14.

"testimony,,f however, misses the point.

This unsupported
The point is that the

crossing protection for this particular crossing was mandated
by the State because of the particular train speed and view
obstructions that existed at that place.

The issue raised by

the Rio Grande's appeal is not whether the State would prevent
it from reducing train speeds, but rather, can a railroad be
negligent if it was operating at the speed the State expected
of it when the State decided upon the appropriate crossing
protection for motorists at that crossing?
In Point I of its Brief, the State elaborately
discusses how its team of experts weighs all the factors and
utilizes its utmost discretion to decide what type of crossing
protection to implement at a particular crossing.
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In this

case, there is no dispute that key factors considered at this
crossing were the train speed of 50 miles per hour and the view
obstructions.

While the State may not have prevented the

railroad from changing these factors, it may well have
downgraded the crossing protection by removing the stop signs
had the railroad decided to remove the visual obstructions or
reduce its train speeds.
The State's use of stop signs at railroad crossings
must be particularly judicious.
restraints.
effective.

Stop signs are passive

They depend upon motorist acceptance to be
The more often they are used unnecessarily in

traffic control, the more often they are disregarded by
motorists.

This is especially true with respect to railroad

crossings.

If stop signs were placed at all crossings,

motorists would soon become conditioned to regard them as
nothing more than crossbucks.

Stop signs must be used

sparingly at railroad crossings, so that motorists will know
there is something especially hazardous about a crossing which
has one.
The State's exclusive authority to determine the type
of crossing protection to be employed at a particular crossing
remains inextricably wed to the factors tohich it considered in
the exercise of that exclusive authority.

If the railroad has

no power to change the crossing protection, it cannot be
negligent if it operates within the parameters expected of it
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by the State when the State determined what signs or other
devices were required to make the crossing safe.

See Rio

Grande Opening Brief at 34-37.
B.

REGULATION OF CROSSING SAFETY DEVICES IS NOT
INHERENTLY AN ESSENTIAL GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION;
RATHER, THE STATE HAS CHOSEN TO HAVE THAT
FUNCTION DONE EXCLUSIVELY BY STATE AGENCIES.

It is important to note that the State's inconsistent
position also inverts the proper analysis for sovereign
immunity.

The State argues that it is immune to suit because

its regulation of railroad crossing protection is something
that can only be done by government, yet it believes the Utah
Legislature in 1975 eliminated its exclusive authority in this
area.

In truth, the situation is just the opposite.
The regulation of highway traffic over railroad

crossings should be more uniform and probably even better if
this power is given exclusively to governmental entities.

This

does not mean, however, that this activity is inherently
something that can only be done by the State.

Indeed, prior to

this century, railroads did decide what, if any, crossing signs
to erect.

Neither can one consider this function to be

"essential to the core of governmental activity."

Standiford

v. Salt Lake City Corp., 604 P.2d 1230, 1237 (1980).
Governments can exist and function satisfactorily without ever
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regulating railroad crossing signs.

This is not inherently a

"governmental function" which would provide the State with
sovereign immunity.
The power to decide what safety devices are to be
employed at railroad crossings in this State could have been
given to railroads and, had this been done, railroads would
undoubtedly be held accountable for any negligence in the
exercise of this power.

However, in this State, neither

railroads nor motorists have the power to implement or change
the safety devices at railroad crossings.

The Utah Legislature

has chosen to give this power exclusively to State agencies.
If the State is negligent in the discharge of this exclusive
duty, and if this negligence causes the death or injury of a
motorist, the only recourse is against the State.

The State

and only the State decides whether the protection at a
particular crossing is adequate for the safety of motorists
approaching that crossing.

If that power is exercised

negligently, the State must be subject to suit or the motorist
will have no redress for that negligence.

This is not an

essential governmental function, but it is one which by choice
the State has undertaken and precluded its private citizens
from doing.

The State does not and should not have immunity

from suit for the negligent exercise of this power.

See Rio

Grande's Opening Brief at 42-49.

Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-13, wherein railroads, not
state agencies, are required to establish certain protection
(fencing) for livestock on land traversed by railroad tracks.
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II.

REPLY TO MR. GLEAVEfS BRIEF--RIO GRANDEfS APPEAL
A.

MR. GLEAVE WAS AT LEAST 11 NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER
OF LAW, AND THE JURY VERDICT MUST BE SET ASIDE
AND A NEW TRIAL ORDERED

Mr. Gleave argues in Point I of his brief (pp. 6-11)
that there was evidence from which a jury could conclude that
the Rio Grande was 100% negligent and that Mr. Gleave was
entirely without fault.

However, a jury cannot change legal

standards set by the Supreme Court of this State and Mr. Gleave
completely ignores the numerous Utah railroad crossing cases
cited and quoted at pages 15-23 of the Rio Grande's opening
brief.

These cases establish the legal standard for

"reasonable" conduct of motorists approaching railroad
crossings in Utah.

The Rio Grande's contention that those

cases compel a finding that Mr. Gleave was negligent as a
matter of law is not even addressed by Mr. Gleavefs brief and
now stands unrebutted.
The jury's failure to attribute at least 1% fault to
Mr. Gleave can mean only that the jury failed to hold Mr.
Gleave to the minimum standard of "reasonable" conduct required
of him under Utah law.

It is undisputed that Mr. Gleave

started to go across the crossing, while looking in the
direction of his relatively unobstructed view (to the right),
rather than in the direction of his highly obstructed view (to
the left.)

(Tr. 1759-1760).

In so proceeding, Mr. Gleave

breached his standard of care as a matter of law, thereby
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making it incumbent upon the jury to find that he was at least
1% negligent.

See Rio Grande's Opening Brief at 4-12, 15-23.

Despite Mr. Gleave's contentions to the contrary, his
expert Mr. Van Wagoner did not provide any evidence to warrant
a finding of 0% fault on the part of Mr. Gleave.

The portion

of Mr. Van Wagoner's testimony reproduced at page 8 of Mr.
Gleave's brief simply does not support a jury finding of 0%
fault on the part of Mr. Gleave.

First, Mr. Van Wagoner did

not offer any testimony as to what Mr. Gleave in fact did on
the morning of the accident.

Second, the testimony that Mr.

Van Wagoner did offer bordered on the banal.

In substance, Mr.

Van Wagoner testified that a train will strike a car every time
a car proceeds across the crossing without leaving enough time
to get to the other side before the train reaches the
crossing.

Stated otherwise, there will be a collision every

time an automobile and a train are on th£ same tracks at the
same time.
Although the Rio Grande believes there was
insufficient evidence to support a verdict that it was
negligent, for the purposes of this appeal, the Court must
decide only whether the jury verdict attributing 0% fault to
Mr. Gleave is supported by the evidence and by the case law
governing the standard of care required of an automobile driver
at a railroad crossing.
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B.

THE RIO GRANDE WAS DEPRIVED OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY

With regard to the Rio Grande's contention that this
Court should order a new trial because the Rio Grande was
deprived of its due process right to an impartial jury, Mr.
Gleave?s brief has completely failed to respond to the cases
cited at pages 23-28 of the Rio Grande's initial brief. Mr.
Gleave?s brief states that the question of juror bias should be
resolved on procedural grounds.

Specifically, Mr. Gleave

maintains that the judgment should be affirmed because the
record is allegedly incomplete.

Mr. Gleave claims that Dr.

Mendenhallfs name was mentioned to the jury during a portion of
the voir dire which, according to an affidavit filed by
counsel for Mr. Gleave, was not transcribed by the court
reporter.
There are several problems with Mr. Gleave's
procedural argument.

First, the only "evidence" that the

transcript is incomplete is a hearsay statement attributed to
lower court reporter Stanley Roundy in the affidavit filed by
Mr. Gleavefs counsel.
Mr. Gleave's brief).

(A copy of the affidavit is appended to
Second, the official transcript of the

voir dire proceedings (Tr. 1655-1675) indicates on the face
of it that the voir dire was only interrupted by one
off-the-record bench conference between the court and counsel.
(Tr. 1662-1663).

Third, the portion of the transcript where

Mr. Gleave's counsel identified his witnesses (Tr. 1659-1660)
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shows that Mr. Gleave's counsel did not identify Dr.
Mendenhall as a prospective witness.

Fourth, Juror Argyle

testified in her affidavit that, to the best of her
recollection, Dr. John Mendenhall was not named as a
prospective witness during the questioning of prospective
jurors.

(Tr. 799; a copy of the Argyle Affidavit is attached

as Exhibit I in the addendum to the Rio Grande's initial brief).
More importantly, even if the record is incomplete,
the fact remains that Juror Argyle had a close relationship
with a key witness for the plaintiff which she did not reveal
to counsel and the court.

Counsel for the plaintiff did not

identify Dr. Mendenhall during voir dire, but even if he did,
the trial was not to an impartial jury.

Counsel for Mr. Gleave

merely attempts to shift the blame from himself to Juror
Argyle.

If counsel did identify Dr. Mendenhall as a plaintiff

witness, Juror Argyle should have revealed to the court the
nature of her association with the doctor before she retired to
deliberate with the rest of the jury.
Regardless of whether the fault lies with plaintiff's
counsel or Juror Argyle, the Rio Grande was deprived of its
right to trial by an impartial jury.

As stated in Anderton v.

Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828, 835 (Utah 1980), "[A] trial court
may order a new trial should it appear that juror bias crept
into the proceeding notwithstanding voir dire questioning."
Id. (emphasis added).

The essential point is not who made the
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mistake;

it is that a mistake was made and that only a new

trial can correct it.
C.

THE LOWER COURT DID NOT REVERSE ITS DENIAL OF
THE RIP'S GRANDE'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AT TRIAL

Mr. Gleave contends at Point III of his brief (pp.
13-14) that any error by the lower court: in denying the Rio
Grande's motion for partial summary judgment is moot because
the lower court allegedly reversed himself by the time of
trial.

In support of that position, Mr. Gleave cites the first

paragraph of Instruction No. 13 (Tr. 737; a copy of instruction
No. 13 is attached as Exhibit 0 in the addendum to the Rio
Grande's initial brief).

Although the first paragraph of

Instruction No. 13 is, indeed, a correct statement of the law,
the second paragraph of Instruction No. 13 is fundamentally
inconsistent with the Rio Grande's motion for partial summary
judgment (and with the first paragraph of instruction No. 13).
Notwithstanding Mr. Gleave's contentions to the contrary, the
trial court did not reverse its decision denying the Rio
Grande's motion for partial summary judgment.

As a result, Mr.

Gleave was allowed to argue to the jury that the Rio Grande had
violated duties which, in fact, did not exist under the
undisputed facts of this case.
D.

THE RIO GRANDE HAS NOT WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO
COMPLAIN ABOUT PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL'S SURPRISE AND
IMPROPER REFERENCE TO WILLIS WOODARD'S TESTIMONY
IN CLOSING ARGUMENT

Mr. Gleave argues in Point IV of his brief (pp. 15-18)
that the Rio Grande has failed to preserve for appeal purposes
-14-

any right to complain about Mr, Gleave's counsel's rebuttal
argument based on the testimony of witness Willis Woodard.

In

fact, Rio Grande properly preserved the Woodard issue as an
appeal point by filing a timely motion for a new trial
regarding the Woodard testimony pursuant to Rule 59(a)(3),
U.R.C.P.

When counsel for Mr. Gleave argued Mr. Woodard1s

testimony to the jury during rebuttal, the Rio Grande was
surprised, and no degree of ordinary prudence could have
protected the Rio Grande against such litigation tactics.
The lower court's dismissal of Mr. Woodard from the
stand during the middle of his direct examination was
extraordinary.

(Tr. 1788-1804).

Such extraordinary action

could hardly be interpreted to mean that Mr. Woodward's
incomplete, and not subject to cross examination, testimony was
proper evidence for the jury to consider.

(See Tr. 1803).

Once counsel for Mr. Gleave commented upon this testimony to
the jury, any objection or "curative" instruction would only
have drawn more attention to this testimony and exacerbated the
damage already done.

Counsel for Mr. Gleave must have acted

purposefully when he chose to taint this jury by referring to
the testimony he so improperly elicited in the first place.
The only effective remedy is a new trial and this was requested
of the lower court.
The surprise reference to Mr. Woodard's testimony did
not constitute harmless error under Rule 61, U.R.C.P. because
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the only "evidence" that the Rio Grande engineer failed to
sound the whistle properly was the testimony of Mr. Woodard-testimony which was improperly elicited, was not subject to
cross-examination, and was improperly argued to the jury.
Counsel for Mr. Gleave obviously determined that Mr. Woodard?s
testimony regarding the sounding of the whistle to be
significant enough to mention to the jury during his final
presentation, just moments before the jury retired to
deliberate.

He cannot now claim this to have been of no

consequence.
E.

THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO ALLOW
THE JURY TO CONSIDER WHETHER MR. GLEAVE FAILED TO
MITIGATE HIS DAMAGES BY NOT WEARING HIS
SEATBELTS.

Mr. Gleave argues at Point V of his brief (pp. 18-24)
that there was no evidence in the record to support a seatbelt/
mitigation of damages instruction.

In fact, there was ample

evidence presented to justify the requested instruction.

Mr.

Gleavefs own treating physician (Dr. Mendenhall) testified that
the injuries to Mr. Gleavefs knee and ankle (which resulted in
Mr. Gleave's permanent partial disability) were injuries
sustained by Mr. Gleave after being ejected from his vehicle
and upon coming into contact with the asphalt.
1209-1211).

(Tr.

The relevant testimony of Dr. Mendenhall is

attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit "A".
Dr. Mendenhallfs opinion is supported by additional
evidence.

Mr. Gleave admitted that he was not wearing his
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seatbelt.

(Tr. 1750).

Plaintiff's Exhibit 2(h) is an 8x10"

color photograph of plaintiff's vehicle as it appeared after
being struck by the Rio Grande's train.

The photograph shows

that the front windshield on the vehicle was not broken despite
the complete and total damage to the front end of the vehicle.
Further evidence regarding the lack of damage to the windows is
found at page 4 of defendant's Exhibit 34. Defendant's Exhibit
34 (a copy of which is attached to the Rio Grande's opening
brief as Exhibit J) is the investigating officer's report of
the traffic accident; it states:
appeared to be totaled.

"Vehicle, a 1975 Chev Monza

all [sic] windshields and side windows

appeared in tact [sic] with the exception of the drivers [sic]
side window which was down (probable point of ejection.)"
Id.

The jury also heard uncontradicted testimony from the

author of Exhibit 34 (Springville police officer Coron)
concerning his visual inspection of the vehicle's passenger
compartment on the morning of the accident:
Mr. Richman: In terms of your investigation did
you ever take a look at the car?
Officer Coron:

The car itself, yes, sir.

Mr. Richman: Did you look into the interior
passenger compartment, driver compartment?
Officer Coron:

Yes, sir, I did.

Mr. Richman: Can you describe to the jury,
please, if you would, Sergeant, what that looked
like inside?

-17-

Officer Coron: It was basically intact. There
was no great structural damage to the passenger
compartment.
(Tr. 1426-1427).
Mr. Gleave contends that the Rio Grande was not
entitled to a "seatbelt" instruction on mitigation of damages
because the Rio Grande failed to produce an expert witness on
that point.

Although our judicial system seems to be relying

more and more upon experts, we have yet to reach the point that
the only proper evidence to permit an attorney to argue a point
to the jury must come from the lips of an expert witness.

The

need for establishing a causal connection between Mr. Gleavers
failure to wear an available seatbelt and the damages sustained
by this omission can be proved by any competent evidence which
is admissible and which tends to show that the injuries were
aggravated by the failure of Mr. Gleave to wear an available
seatbelt.
Having demonstrated (1) that Mr. Gleave was not
wearing his seatbelt, (2) that the passenger compartment and
windows of plaintiff's vehicle remained intact even after the
collision, and (3) that Mr. Gleavefs own doctor agreed that Mr.
Gleave's injuries were consistent with the sort of injuries
that were sustained outside the passenger compartment, the Rio
Grande was entitled to argue to the jury and have it determine
whether Mr. Gleave could have reduced the extent of his damages
by wearing a seatbelt.
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III.

REPLY TO MR. GLEAVE'S CROSS-APPEAL
A.

PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT
INTEREST ON THAT PORTION OF HIS DAMAGES
DESIGNATED BY THE JURY AS "LOST FUTURE EARNINGS"

The first point raised by Mr. Gleavefs cross-appeal is
his contention that the lower court erred in refusing to award
him 8% prejudgment interest on that $275>000 portion of his
damages denominated by the jury as "loss of future earnings and
earning capacity" (R. 767)" (i.e., the earnings that Mr. Gleave
would not earn subsequent to the time of the trial).
Mr. Gleave asserts that his position is based on Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-44 (1953, as amended).

However, Section

78-27-44, enacted in 1975, provides in pertinent part:
In all actions brought to recover damages for
personal injuries sustained by any person. . . .
it shall be lawful for the plaintiff in the
complaint to claim interest on the special
damages alleged from the date of the occurrence
of the act giving rise to the cause of action
and it shall be the duty of the court, in
entering judgment for plaintiff in that action,
to add to the amount of damages assessed by the
verdict of the jury, or found by the court,
interest on that amount calculated at 8% per
annum from the date of the occurrence of the act
giving rise to the cause of action to the date of
entering the judgment, and to include it in that
judgment.
Id. (emphas i s added).
Mr. Gleave's cross-appeal is contrary to both the
letter and spirit of Section 78-27-44.

The letter of the

statute expressly provides that prejudgment interest shall only
apply to "that amount" of special damages prayed for in the
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complaint "alleged from the date of the occurrence of the act
giving rise to the cause of action."

Id.

Under Section

78-27-44, therefore, damages which did not accrue to Mr. Gleave
between "the date of the occurrence" and the time of trial do
not qualify for prejudgment interest.

Consistent with the

letter of Section 78-27-44, the lower court did award Mr.
Gleave $14,179.81 prejudgment interest on his prejudgment
special damages, including his prejudgment medical expenses and
the $20,000 portion of his damages denominated by the jury as
"past lost wages" (i.e. wages lost between the date of the
accident and the date of the trial).
Mr. Gleavefs claim for prejudgment interest on wages
lost subsequent to the trial date also violates the spirit of
the prejudgment interest statute.

The Legislature intended no

more than to provide successful personal injury plaintiffs a
reasonable award for prejudgment interest on out-of-pocket
damages sustained by the plaintiff between the time of injury
and the time of trial.

The Legislature did not intend that

personal injury plaintiffs would reap a windfall.
There is an additional important reason to reject Mr.
Gleave's construction of Section 78-27-44. Namely, the jury's
$275,000 award of lost future earning capacity was based on the
jury's evaluation of the detailed "present value" testimony of
expert witness Frank Stuart.

(Tr. 1518-1576).

Mr. Stuart

testified that he assumed (1) that Mr. Gleave's base salary
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would have increased at an average rate of 8.2% per year and
(2) that the average annual rate of return for a diversified
portfolio of investments would be 7.89%.

(Tr. 1524-1529).

As

such, the jury's $275,000 award to Mr. Gleave's for lost future
earning capacity already reflects the jury's considered
evaluation of the discounted present value of Mr. Gleave's
future stream of anticipated income.
B.

THE LOWER COURT'S ORDER GRANTING THE RIO
GRANDE'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT ON
PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
'

The second point raised by Mr. Gleave's cross-appeal
is that the lower court erred in granting at the close of
plaintiff's evidence the Rio Grande's motion for a directed
verdict on Mr. Gleave's claim for punitive damages.

In fact,

even when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to
plaintiff, a jury could never award punitive damages.

The

lower court's order granting a directed verdict on punitive
damages should be affirmed.
Mr. Gleave's claim for punitive damages is wholly at
odds with the testimony of his own expert witness Van Wagoner.
Specifically, at page 29 of his brief--and similarly when he
argued against the directed verdict motion in front of the
lower court (Tr. 1353)--Mr. Gleave puts forth the bizarre
proposition that the Rio Grande should be penalized with
punitive damages for asking to have a stop sign installed at
the subject crossing.

However, even Mr. Van Wagoner
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unequivocally testified that the Rio Grande's desire to have a
stop sign at the subject crossing made sense as a temporary
measure (i.e., until UDOT obtained Federal funds to install
active signals):
Mr. Richman: Okay. But if UDOT made the
recommendation, that is the Utah Department of
Transportation, at least on a temporary basis
that a stop sign should go in there, you would at
least believe preliminary [sic] they didn't make
that decision indiscriminately, would you not?
Mr. Van Wagoner: That is correct. And frankly
as an interim measure I would have suggested the
same thing.
(Tr. 1627; accord Tr. 1628).

The fact that the State, for

financial or other reasons, still has not implemented flashing
lights at this crossing does not make the railroad's request of
a stop sign wrongful.

Before the railroad requested a stop

sign, this crossing was only protected by cross bucks.

Even

Mr. Gleave's expert believed the stop sign was an improvement
which he would have suggested.
The uncontroverted evidence in this case is that there
were no prior accidents at the crossing as of 1974 when the
UDOT surveillance team recommended installation of the stop
sign.

(Tr. 1240-1241).

For Mr. Gleave to suggest that it was

"willful and malicious" or even "reckless" for the Rio Grande
to want a stop sign contradicts common sense and all the
evidence.

No conceivable social purpose could be served by

punishing the Rio Grande for wanting UDOT to install a stop
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sign at this crossing; the lower court's ruling on the question
of punitive damages should be affirmed.
None of the cases from other jurisdictions cited at
pages 31 and 33 of Mr. Gleavefs brief add anything to the
mature body of modern Utah case law concerning punitive
damages.

Moreover, the foreign cases cited by Mr. Gleave,

arose against very different statutory backgrounds, do not
apply the same standards recognized in Utah, and do not involve
fact situations remotely similar to this case.
On page 31 of his brief, Mr. Gleave does cite six Utah
cases following this statement:

"Utah has recently allowed

punitive damages in a wide variety of circumstances."
Brief at 31.

This, of course, is true.

Gleave

But no Utah Court has

ever suggested that punitive damages would be proper in a case
similar to this one.
This Court has stated that punitive damages generally
are not appropriate and must be allowed bnly where to do so
would "serve a societal interest of punishing and deterring
outrageous and malicious conduct which is not likely to be
deterred by other means."

Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospitals,

Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted).
In this instance, there is no evidence of willful or
malicious conduct.

There is not even any evidence that the

railroad consciously disregarded the public safety of others, a
standard which under Utah law would not justify punitive
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damages.

If the Rio Grande were to try this case to a

completely impartial jury, with proper jury instructions and no
references by plaintiff to improperly elicited testimony, it is
doubtful that the railroad would even be found to have been
negligent in this instance.

The trial court did not err in

dismissing plaintiff's claims for punitive damages.
CONCLUSION:

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse
the judgment entered by the lower court, reinstate the Amended
Complaint as against co-defendant UDOT, and remand for a new
trial.

During the new trial, the jury should be instructed

See Gleave Brief at 31. In Terry v. ZCMI, 605 P.2d 314
(Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court held that legal malice
could support a punitive damage award in a false imprisonment
case. A subsequent decision, Branch v. Western Petroleum,
Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982) followed Terry and these two
cases were noted in dicta in Behrens v. Raleigh Hills
Hospital, Inc. 675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983). The
foundation for this line of cases, Terry v. ZCMI, was
overruled in McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, 678 P.2d 298 (Utah
1984) wherein this Court held actual malice and not mere legal
malice was required to support a punitive damage award. See
also, First Security Bank v. J.B.J. Feedyards, 653 P.2d 591,
598 (Utah 1982) ("Such damages [i.e., punitive damages] may be
awarded where the nature of the wrong complained of and the
injury inflicted goes beyond merely violating the rights of
another in that it is found to be willful and malicious.");
Kesler y. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354, 359 (Utah 1975) (stating that
the punitive damages remedy should be applied only upon a
showing of "willful and malicious" conduct when it "seems to
one's sense of justice that mere recompense for actual loss is
inadequate," and even then "with caution" because it is an
extraordinary remedy "outside the field of usual redressful
remedies").
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that the plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law, with the
jury to determine the degree to which plaintiff's negligence
and the negligence, if any, of the Rio Gfande and UDOT
proximately caused this accident.
With respect to Mr. Gleave's crdss-appeal, this court
should affirm the lower court's rulings with respect to
pre-judgment interest and punitive damages.
DATED this 2 ^ d a y of June, 1985.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
E. Scott Savage
Michael F. Richman
Patrick J. O'Harp.
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Reply Brief Addendum Exhibit "A"
Description:

Part of the cross-examination
testimony of Mr. Gleavefs physician,
Dr. John Mendenhall, reproduced from
Tr. 1205, line 12 through Tr. 1211,
line 1.

Mr. Richman: You had mentioned, Doctor, that with
respect to the knee you found in the emergency room a
lot of direct and foreign material in the knee, is
that correct, sir?
Dr. Mendenhall:

That is correctt.

Mr. Richman: Are you aware, Doctor, that Mr. Gleave
was ejected from his automobile at the time of the
accident?
Dr. Mendenhall:

Yes.

Mr. Richman: You have handled, I take it, numerous
automobile accidents or accidents where people have
come in contact with asphalt paving, that type of
thing?
Dr. Mendenhall:
Mr. Richman:

Yes.

More than fifty?

Dr. Mendenhall:

Yes.

Mr. Richman: And when one corned in contact with
asphalt paving you would anticipate, would you not,
that he is going to have some of the gravel or the
dirt that is on that asphalt paving in the joint that
came into contact with that pavement?
Dr. Mendenhall:

Yes.

Mr. Richman: The knee was fairly well ripped up in a
sense that it was open, muscles and bones were
showing, isn't that correct?
Dr. Mendenhall:

Correct.

Mr. Richman: And that is consistent, is it not, with
banging one's knee on asphalt pavement at high
velocities?
Dr. Mendenhall:

Yes.

Mr. Richman: And the fact that: dirt is in his knee
that is consistent with hitting one's knee on the
asphalt paving, is that true?
Dr. Mendenhall:

That is correct.

Mr. Richman: The same scenario we have just gone
through, that would be true for Mr. Gleavefs foot
also, would it not?
Dr. Mendenhall:

It could be true for the foot.

Mr. Richman: Sure. And the elbow, as I recall, that
was open and muscles and bones were showing on that,
too, isn't that true?
Dr. Mendenhall:

Correct.

Mr. Richman: That was a lot of dirt and foreign
material in there also?
Dr. Mendenhall:

Correct.

